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Misunderstanding IT: Hospital cybersecurity and IT 
problems reach the courts  
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The corruption of patient data in a hospital prompted 
a criminal investigation, resulting in approximately 70 
nurses being disciplined, with some charged with 
wilful neglect contrary to the Mental Capacity Act 
2005. Some nurses received custodial sentences. This 
paper explains the background. The paper 
demonstrates the inability of hospital information 
technology (IT) systems and management to provide 
reliable evidence and highlights broad problems with 
poor IT culture affecting manufacturers, hospitals, 
police, lawyers, and advisors — all the way through to 
regulators and legislators. Widespread 
misunderstandings of IT and data compromises both 
the provision of effective care and legal processes. 
This paper includes recommendations, the most 
urgent being that hospitals (the UK National Health 
System (‘NHS’) and other national healthcare systems 
more generally) should acknowledge that IT is 
unreliable, and that they should procure and actively 
manage IT equipment with this in mind. Keeping up-
to-date with legal issues relating to IT generally, as 
well as keeping up-to-date with cybersecurity 
measures should be routine. 
The NHS needs to improve its IT maturity, 
management and policies. The police, the legal system 
and regulators also need a more mature approach to 
IT. Manufacturers are not currently providing 
dependable systems that are fit for purpose to 
operate safely and reliably in normal, complex 
hospital environments. All parties should engage 
qualified external oversight. 
Introduction  
 
This paper summarizes my insights from being an 
expert witness in a criminal case involving alleged 
fabrication of patient data by nurses.1 I am a professor 
of computer science and a research fellow in digital 
health; the expertise I brought to this case was 
                                                          
1 R v Cahill; R v Pugh 14 October 2014, Crown Court at Cardiff, 
T20141094 and T20141061 before HHJ Crowther QC. 
computer science, but more so, a scientific refusal to 
accept computer evidence at face value without 
question. For example, most evidence in this case was 
presented as Excel spreadsheets — but it is well-
known that it is easy to delete or tamper with data in 
Excel without leaving any trace.2 The data in this case 
showed distinctive statistical patterns suggesting 
deleted or corrupted data, but nobody else 
questioned the evidence at that stage, despite IT 
failure being a well-known hazard3 that is poorly 
regulated.4 
The outcome and details of the court case are in the 
public domain, in particular, the judge’s Ruling has 
been published in this journal5 and the hospital has 
published an external review after the event.6 
However, the aim of this paper is not to tell a story 
about the hospital or its nurses, but rather to tell a 
more worrying story: this could happen anywhere — 
and probably is happening everywhere. 
In view of understandable sensitivities, this paper 
minimises citations to the prosecution and related 
evidence. I have not changed technical details or 
operating procedures. Numbers have been rounded 
and ward names changed: the exact values and names 
                                                          
2 See ‘Business records’ that illustrates this issue in detail: Stephen 
Mason and Daniel Seng, editors, Electronic Evidence (4th edition, 
Institute of Advanced Legal Studies for the SAS Humanities Digital 
Library, School of Advanced Study, University of London, 2017), xii–
xiii. 
3 ECRI Institute, Top 10 Health Technology Hazards for 2015, (No. 
2. Data Integrity: Incorrect or Missing Data in EHRs and Other 
Health IT Systems), 2014, available at 
www.ecri.org/Documents/White_papers/Top_10_2015.pdf . 
4 C. Heneghan, M. Thompson, M. Billingsley and D. Cohen, 
‘Medical-device recalls in the UK and the device-regulation process: 
Retrospective review of safety notices and alerts’, BMJ Open, 
1:e000155, 2011. DOI: 10.1136/bmjopen-2011-000155, available at 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3191575/ . 
5 Ruling in R v Cahill; R v Pugh 14 October 2014, Crown Court at 
Cardiff, T20141094 and T20141061 before HHJ Crowther QC, 14 
Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review (2017) 67–
71. 
6 Angela Hopkins, Commissioned Review, June to September 2016 
Review of the Blood Glucometry Investigations in Abertawe Bro 
Morgannwg University Health Board Establishing lessons learned 
(Abertawe Bro Morgannwg University Health Board, 2017), available 
at 
http://www.wales.nhs.uk/sitesplus/documents/863/4.5%20Blood%20
Glucometry.pdf . 
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are not relevant to the story. The judge’s Ruling 
identifies the equipment (blood glucometers) which 
were Abbott XceedPro meters, made by Abbott 
Laboratories, Inc. (Abbott); Abbott was also 
responsible for the database, called Precision Web, 
which stored data from the meters. However, this 
manufacturer is not unusual: their products are of 
typical quality and design. 
The judge excluded some evidence from the jury as 
being prejudicial under s 78 of the Police and Criminal 
Evidence Act 1984. Evidence was derived from flawed 
data, flawed IT, and flawed management of IT. Nurses 
were blamed for these failures. As this paper explains, 
the underlying causes must be properly understood as 
basic software issues that should have been taken 
seriously as and when they originally happened. 
Indeed, it is baffling that the hospital failed to detect 
and address the corruption of the databases that had 
been in continual clinical use over a period of years. 
It is to be speculated as to how many other cases — 
internally or reaching the courts — inappropriately 
blame and pursue clinicians caught up in fallout from 
hospital IT chaos, with nobody recognizing or wanting 
to admit or check whether IT can cause the problems. 
Poor IT, and poorly managed IT, can induce clinical7 
and other error, contribute to error, exacerbate error, 
cause huge costs,8 and make it hard to disentangle 
true causes. 
Cybersecurity maturity  
Cybersecurity is the protection of IT systems 
(including devices with embedded computers, such as 
glucometers and MRI scanners, etc) and data from the 
theft, damage, and disruption. Cybersecurity is a high-
profile activity, regularly reported in the news media, 
often working against international malicious 
attackers (including state security services with 
considerable expertise) who seek vulnerabilities to 
exploit, perhaps for blackmail or terrorism, but 
cybersecurity incidents also occur frequently from 
insider attacks. Some internal users may be motivated 
by retribution, but many users are well-meaning and 
unintentionally perform unsafe or insecure operations 
                                                          
7 Harold Thimbleby, Alexis Lewis and John Williams, ‘Making 
healthcare safer by understanding, designing and buying better IT,’ 
Clinical Medicine, 15(3):258–262, 2015. DOI: 
10.7861/clinmedicine.15-3-258, available at 
http://www.clinmed.rcpjournal.org/content/15/3/258.full.pdf+html . 
8 NHS trust £14m debt partly “due to patient system failure”’, BBC 
News, 9 May 2018, available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-
england-gloucestershire-44052432 . 
that compromise systems. In particular, external 
hackers may deliberately mislead well-intentioned 
internal users with phishing, which tricks them into 
compromising their systems. 
Mature IT management means staying abreast of the 
latest methods used by hackers, keeping track of 
system weaknesses (vulnerabilities) as they are 
discovered, and using reliable means to protecting 
systems against these problems. Protection can be 
based on software or physical means, such as 
conventional physical security (locked doors, access 
restrictions, etc) and network firewalls that isolate the 
IT systems from the internet and hackers operating 
anywhere in the world. Keeping software up to date is 
also essential, as hackers often exploit old errors in 
systems. 
Secondly, management should detect problems and 
disruption, and have in place procedures for limiting 
and recovering from damage. Systems may be taken 
offline to isolate them from attacks, and IT data and 
services may be recovered by restoring lost or 
corrupted data from secure backups. Note that 
cybersecurity requires a long-term plan; it may be 
impractical to recover after some cyber problems if 
adequate measures (such as regular backup and 
recovery protocols) were not developed and put into 
practice long before the incident. Cyberattacks often 
have a reputational impact, and organisations need to 
manage media relations. 
Sometimes IT problems occur during software 
upgrades, but the consequences can be similar. 
Fortunately, effective standard operating procedures 
for cybersecurity will detect problems, recover lost 
work and return the systems to an operational level 
regardless of how they occur. Likewise, good 
cybersecurity protects against problems caused by 
hardware failure, fire, electricity outages and many 
other risks. 
Most of the time IT systems work very well, so it is 
possible to become complacent and ignore 
cybersecurity and the inherent problems with 
software errors, and also ignore the necessary 
investment in staff and training. Cybersecurity 
maturity assesses how well an organisation and 
individuals in it understand and effectively manage 
their cybersecurity. An individual might just backup a 
few files on their laptop in case it is stolen or breaks, 
but an organisation typically has a complex network 
and has many systems and staff to manage; their 
 
Misunderstanding IT: Hospital cybersecurity and IT problems reach the courts                               vvvvvvvv   
 
 
Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review, 15 (2018) | 13 
 
cybersecurity procedures should include auditing and 
staff training, as well as sophisticated off-site methods 
for reliable backup and data recovery. Many 
organisations will integrate cybersecurity 
management with compliance with the General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR)9 and other data 
protection laws. In the NHS there are additional 
concerns for protecting patient data and privacy that 
should also be protected by cybersecurity systems. 
In the case described in this paper, electronic patient 
data was corrupted by an authorised but misguided 
internal act. The deletion and corruption of data was 
not detected, although it created discrepancies with 
paper records made by nurses. The hospital and 
police, apparently unaware of the standard issues 
relating to software errors and cybersecurity, 
assumed the nurses had fabricated the paper records. 
People were unaware of the cybersecurity breach and 
its significance until several weeks into the court case. 
High level view  
Important electronic evidence was declared 
prejudicial by the judge, which meant the prosecution 
offered no evidence, and the two nurses who entered 
pleas of not guilty were released.10 The problems with 
the data, the final understanding of which led to the 
evidence being declared prejudicial by the trial judge, 
should have been detected when the data was 
corrupted. This internal oversight, together with the 
risk of cyberattacks that may be overlooked, 
illustrates the scope and reach of IT and problems 
relating to cybersecurity and the failure to understand 
that software and electronic evidence is prone to 
error. It is alarming to think — as the case described 
in the paper shows — that corrupted data can remain 
unnoticed in hospitals for years before action is taken, 
and even then it is misinterpreted. 
WannaCry11 is an example of a well-known 
cyberattack that made data unusable. With 
WannaCry, patient data was just encrypted (that is, 
                                                          
9 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with 
regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement 
of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC, OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, 
p. 1–88. 
10 ‘Nurses cleared of wilful neglect at Princess of Wales Hospital in 
Bridgend,’ South Wales Evening Post, 14 October 2015, 
http://www.southwales-eveningpost.co.uk/nurses-cleared-wilful-
neglect-princess-wales/story-27983645-detail/story.html ; ‘Princess 
of Wales Hospital nurse neglect trial collapses,’ BBC News, 14 
October 2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-wales-south-east-
wales-34527845. 
11 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WannaCry_ransomware_attack . 
made obviously unusable, and effectively deleted), 
but future cyberattacks will certainly maliciously 
corrupt data (for instance, by changing patient blood 
groups). Such attacks would have disastrous 
consequences. Healthcare cyberattacks are ‘growing 
exponentially’12 — with 113 million US electronic 
health records breached in 2015. 
Much good guidance is available13 (see also the list of 
recommendations at the end of this paper) — 
although cybersecurity is continually advancing, and 
up-to-date, competent professional oversight is 
required. For many organizations, immediate external 
review should be a priority; clearly, whatever 
cybersecurity procedures the police, the Crown 
Prosecution Service lawyers and hospital were using, 
they failed and they did not know they had failed. 
This story is about the widespread misunderstanding 
of IT in healthcare, and in particular, about 
mismanagement of IT by hospitals, the police and the 
lawyers. This cannot be a single one-off example. 
There must be many other cases where clinicians have 
been blamed for hospital IT chaos, where nobody 
recognizes or admits, or checks that IT can be the 
cause of such problems. Hospitals spend a great deal 
of money on IT, and they have IT staff to manage it; 
there is a significant financial and personal investment 
in this being right, so it is psychologically very 
satisfying to blame the users (nurses in this case).14 
Indeed, IT is complicated, and it is very difficult to 
question it — we live in a technological world that 
relies on us all uncritically buying more and more IT 
(e.g., newer mobile telephones and tablets). 
Manufacturers naturally feed our belief that IT solves 
problems, overlooking that IT also causes some of 
them. 
 
 
                                                          
12 Joe Davidson, ‘Cyberattacks on personal health records growing 
‘exponentially’,’ Washington Post, 28 September 2016, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2016/09/28/cy
berattacks-on-personal-health-records-growing-
exponentially/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.3ddf7519fbe3 . 
13 Kevin Fu, Harold Thimbleby, Juuso Leinonen and Ben Ransford, 
‘Six Factors Essential for Mitigating Cyber Risks in Healthcare,’ 
Association for the Advancement of Medical Instrumentation, 2017. 
Available online at 
www.aami.org/productspublications/articledetail.aspx?ItemNumber=
5472 ; DSIWG, Data Safety Initiative Working Group, Data safety 
guidance, Safety Critical Systems Club, version 2.0, 
https://scsc.uk/r127B:1 . 
14 Carol Tavris and Elliot Aronson, Mistakes Were Made (But Not by 
Me): Why We Justify Foolish Beliefs, Bad Decisions, and Hurtful 
Acts (Harcourt Inc: Florida, 2007). 
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The public perspective  
Concerns about the quality of patient care in a 
hospital ward led to a police investigation. For the 
criminal investigation, the police focused on the 
treatment of vulnerable adults, and some acts that 
could be deemed to be criminal, even though there is 
no patient harm. Indeed, in this case there was no 
patient harm or any poor care. 
The news media reported stories of many — about 70 
— nurses being investigated. There was considerable 
political and public interest in this case. That the 
hospital suspended many nurses (about 70), with 
some being indicted, seemed to confirm that there 
were problems similar to the scandal at the hospital 
run by the Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust, 
discussed in the Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation 
Trust Public Inquiry (‘The Francis Report’).15 At Mid 
Staffs, perhaps 1,200 patients died as a result of poor 
care between 2005 and 2009. 
The 70 nurses were alleged to have fabricated blood 
glucose readings (that is, it was alleged the nurses did 
not actually take any readings from patients) by 
writing up fabricated readings in paper patient notes. 
However, if the nurses had actually taken blood 
glucose readings, the Xceed Pro glucometers they 
used should have recorded the test results in the 
Abbott Precision Web database. For some nurses, 
corresponding data was missing from the database, 
and it was therefore presumed the glucometers had 
never been used and that the paper notes must 
therefore be fraudulent. 
For vulnerable adult patients this would constitute a 
criminal offence. The nurses were charged for wilful 
neglect, contrary to s 44 of the Mental Capacity Act 
2005. The implication was that the nurses were lazy 
and dishonest and had put patients at risk. Three 
nurses entered pleas of guilty, and two entered pleas 
not guilty. Their case proceeded to trial. 
Abbott’s Xceed Pro blood glucometers were used in 
the hospital, and they are intended to automatically 
upload glucose readings to a central patient record 
system called Precision Web, also made by Abbott. 
The police established that this central record system 
had no records of many tests the nurses had written 
on patient paper notes. The police concluded that the 
                                                          
15 The Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust Public Inquiry, 
Chaired by Robert Francis QC (February 2013), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/report-of-the-mid-
staffordshire-nhs-foundation-trust-public-inquiry . 
nurses had written down fictitious readings and had 
not bothered to do their job properly. 
The police considered various ways the nurses may 
have made accidental errors, such as writing down 
numbers close to but not identical to the glucometer’s 
actual results, a possibility that they discounted. The 
police compared paper records with the computer 
database, involving around 150,000 test records — a 
great deal of combined manual and computer work. 
Although the police considered whether nurses had 
made innocent errors, they never explored whether 
the IT systems or the glucometers may have made 
errors — given that the IT systems and glucometers 
are programmed and managed by ordinary, fallible 
humans, and computer errors are notorious, this was 
a significant oversight in the investigation.16 
In addition to identifying the alleged fabrication (that 
is, paper records with no corresponding computer 
records), the police found evidence of many cases of 
poor operating practice. For example, a nurse is 
supposed to enter the patient’s identity number (ID) 
into the glucometer, but sometimes a nurse will scan 
a staff card instead. This is easier, and enables the 
glucometer to work, so the nurse can quickly obtain a 
test reading. From the computer records it was clear 
there were many cases of this practice. (The next 
section, below, describes in more detail what nurses 
are supposed to do.) 
The nurses that were the subject of the criminal 
investigation had followed such bad practice 
repeatedly. 
The prosecution case was that there were no 
problems with the equipment. There are national 
databases in the UK and USA for reporting problems, 
and no related problems had been reported with 
Abbott’s systems. Therefore, it was suggested, the 
bad practice was a nursing problem, not a system 
problem. 
Eventually, as this paper describes, the case collapsed. 
At the end of the trial, television crews filmed a 
patient victim group protesting outside the court. The 
media presented the collapse of the trial as a failure, 
as if the nurses were still guilty because the trial only 
collapsed on legal technicalities. The other nurses 
who had previously entered pleas of guilty were later 
sentenced, some to community service and some to 
prison. 
                                                          
16 For which see chapter 6 in Electronic Evidence. 
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What nurses do on the ward  
To help patients manage blood glucose levels, 
particularly if the patients have limited capacity to 
look after themselves, it is important to take and 
record blood glucose test readings and to intervene 
quickly if a patient requires treatment. The body 
normally regulates blood glucose (blood sugar) levels 
closely, but in diabetics, the body’s normal regulation 
fails and levels have to be corrected by insulin (if too 
high) or by sugar (if too low). Both high and low levels 
of blood glucose cause serious medical problems, 
including confusion and unconsciousness. In everyday 
life, diabetics are usually very competent at managing 
their blood glucose levels, but hospital patients 
generally need help, particularly if they have mobility 
problems, dementia or other cognitive problems.17 
Using a glucometer, an outline of the typical nurse 
operating procedure is as follows: 
(i) Find a glucometer (typically they are stored 
in a cabinet). 
(ii) The nurse then identifies themselves to 
the device by scanning the barcode on their 
staff card or by typing their ID on the 
glucometer keyboard. 
(iii) The patient ID is scanned from their 
barcode or typed, perhaps copying from 
patient notes. 
(v) The patient’s finger is cleaned and pricked, 
and a drop of blood placed on a special test 
strip. 
(vi) The test strip is inserted in the 
glucometer. 
(vii) The glucometer displays the blood 
glucose level (or possibly an error, such as 
there being too little blood for it to work). 
(viii) The nurse may then take immediate 
action to address any clinical issues. 
(ix) The nurse then writes down on the paper 
patient notes the time and reading. 
(x) One further step, which has no immediate 
clinical significance, is that the glucometer 
                                                          
17 Type 2 diabetes in adults: management, UK National Institute for 
Health and Care Excellence (NICE, 2015), available at 
https://www.nice.org.uk/guidance/ng28 . 
must eventually be placed in a dock (possibly 
after taking many readings), and then its data 
will be automatically uploaded to central 
database systems. 
The above procedures are intended to give the 
general idea; in a clinical setting, there are other steps 
(e.g., the nurse should wear gloves) which are omitted 
here as they are not relevant to this paper. 
The Abbott glucometer itself can record over 2,000 
readings in its internal memory before it needs to be 
docked, and it will display a warning if the memory is 
full and, if so, it cannot be used further. The memory 
feature means that Abbott’s glucometer can be used 
for batching tests: a nurse can test each patient in 
turn on a whole ward, respond to patients’ needs, 
then later write up all the results using the 
glucometer review screen to recollect individual test 
details. Once successfully uploaded to Abbott’s 
systems, the test readings should later appear in the 
main patient records available on ward PCs — 
however, this might take days or longer (see below). 
Workarounds  
 
Barcode workarounds are a well-known problem.18 It 
can be hard to scan or read the patient ID, so one 
workaround is to type 000 etc on the glucometer 
keyboard, or much more easily, scan a staff ID 
barcode. Both workarounds obtain a number that the 
glucometer accepts as a valid ‘patient ID’ so the nurse 
can then use the glucometer to get a reading. Using 
the staff ID instead of the patient ID is called ‘double 
tapping.’ Double tapping was routine: there were 
about 700 double taps done with 200 different nurse 
IDs, accounting for 25 per cent of all nurse IDs in the 
database. Double tapping was to be used as evidence 
of bad character, within the meaning of section 98 of 
the Criminal Justice Act 2003. 
The glucometer keyboard is like that of a telephone: 
you can type anything, for instance pressing 2 can also 
enter A, B or C. There are cases in the database 
where, instead of a patient ID (or even a nurse ID), the 
patient’s name was entered (which is of course as 
slow and tedious as it would be to type on a 
telephone digit keyboard), and sometimes the patient 
                                                          
18 Ross Koppel, Tosha Wetterneck, Joel Leon Telles and Ben-Tzion 
Karsh, ‘Workarounds to barcode medication administration systems: 
Their Occurrences, Causes, and Threats to Patient Safety,’ Journal 
of the American Medical Informatics Association, 15(4): 408 – 423, 
2008, available at https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/18436903 . 
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ID was entered as MALE or FEMALE. This suggests 
some nurses were not well trained to use the 
glucometer. These are basic errors recorded over 
several years in the database that nobody in the 
hospital was picking up or correcting. 
The Abbott glucometer accepts all of these 
workarounds (arbitrary IDs, double tapping, text such 
as MALE) and will still give a correct blood glucose 
reading. Unknown to the nurses, however, the 
hospital IT administrators had configured the system 
to reject such data, and store it separately. Manual 
intervention (which may never happen, or may 
introduce further errors) is then required to fix it. It 
should be noted that configuring the system in this 
way makes sense: the blood glucose reading in the 
database cannot be reliably associated with any 
particular patient in the database until the issue is 
manually resolved. 
Double tapping and other workarounds, since they 
can be automatically detected, arguably should have 
been detected and sorted out immediately rather 
than ignored. The devices can be configured to detect 
these problems immediately they occur. Since double 
tapping was so prevalent and not reported, it is 
probable that nurses were not aware it was 
problematic, nor that it was being recorded; it was 
what everybody did. Since data at this hospital 
regularly got lost, this fact would further confirm to 
nurses the irrelevance of docking the glucometer. 
An expert witness perspective  
 
I was invited by the defence team to be an expert 
witness. My first comment was that if so many nurses 
were alleged to have made the same mistakes, it 
would surely seem more likely there may be a 
common explanation, such as an IT failure that would 
affect everybody, or there may have been a 
cyberattack or some other IT problem. An IT 
technician with a vendetta could have done anything 
to the data. The prosecution view, however, was that 
if many nurses are making the same mistakes, they 
were doing so deliberately and, moreover, were all in 
it together. I wondered why the hospital had not 
intervened earlier (Abbott’s system could have been 
configured to warn them) as the data covered a long 
period spanning over years. The nurses had 
apparently developed bad habits, perhaps learning it 
off each other. It seemed plausible to me that the 
hospital had not properly managed or monitored the 
data until the investigation and prosecution started. 
I do not know, but it is possible that the hospital 
suffered from what is called ‘baseline shifting.’ At 
first, one nurse was suspected of fraudulent record 
keeping, and that would seem plausible, albeit sad. 
So, one nurse is now the baseline. Later, another 
nurse is suspected of fraudulent behaviour. Now two 
is the baseline: it has only increased by one. A second 
suspect nurse is plausible because it is only one more 
than the baseline, which has already been accepted. 
One by one, more nurses are identified. These 
discoveries then fit a pattern. After a point, nobody is 
surprised if another nurse is suspected. Had all the 70 
or so nurses been suspected on the first day, perhaps 
alternative explanations might have been urgently 
considered, but once 69 nurses have been suspected, 
there is no surprise with the 70th. 
My first task was to analyse the prosecution evidence 
(presented as a CD of Excel spreadsheets and, later, as 
data logged on blood glucometers as well as SQL and 
XML files) to see if the police had made any mistakes 
in claiming that the glucometer test data was not 
there. It was easy to show that the data the police 
claimed was not there was indeed not there. Nor was 
closely related data, as might be expected if 
glucometer clocks were not synchronized with nurse 
watches, or if the nurses had made minor 
transcription errors. 
If data was not present, it implied, so the prosecution 
claimed, that the nurses had fabricated doing actual 
tests — for if they had actually done the tests, the 
data would be present in the spreadsheets. That is 
possible, but I thought it far more likely that IT 
problems or even a technician with a grudge would be 
a simpler explanation — indeed, the normal operation 
of Abbott’s system requires administrators to make 
changes to data, for instance to sort out double 
tapping. What else could administrators or even 
hacking do? 
That over 20 per cent of the database entries had an 
‘error flag’ set raised my suspicions; this was 
becoming a more complex story than the prosecution 
painted. 
Another worry was that a comment field on each test 
said ‘Wrong patient’ for just two entries, and nothing 
at all for the remaining hundreds of thousands of 
entries. This suggested to me that nobody was paying 
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much attention to the management of the database; 
indeed, the ‘reviewed’ flag was ‘No’ for all but two of 
the data entries. If it had been ‘No’ for all of them, 
that could be explained if the hospital did not use the 
field at all, but as it has been set a few times, it 
suggests poor data management. 
 
Figure 1. Recorded movement of glucometer dockings 
around the hospital over a period of one year. Note 
the centrality of the laboratory as a hub of movement, 
and that Ward 22 seems to have a lot of activity — 25 
movements. Since wards presumably try to maintain a 
constant stock of glucometers, there must be other 
movement that is not being recorded. (The diagram 
layout is arbitrary and unrelated to the real 
numbering and locations of wards, and to further help 
preserve anonymity, some of the ‘wards’ are not 
strictly wards at all.) 
I noted that staff names occurred with many 
implausibly close variant spellings (e.g., differing in 
capitalization or spacing, or close variants like Jon and 
John, Justina and Justyna, Kimberley and Kimberly, or 
Diana and Diane with the same surname), sometimes 
but not always with the same ID. Also, many identical 
staff names occurred with different numeric IDs and 
some occurred in variants like ‘name’ as well as ‘name 
(bank nurse)’ with a separate ID. All this, and more, 
suggested the database was not well-managed and 
might not be reliable. Moreover, the poor staff data 
suggests that the Abbott features for only permitting 
authorized staff to use the glucometer might have 
been compromised (for instance, it is questionable as 
to how the device could reliably lock out unauthorized 
staff when the staff data itself was so poor). 
Everyone took it for granted that IDs correctly identify 
nurses. If nurses share their ID cards (knowingly or 
unknowingly) then the ID recorded by the glucometer 
is the ID of the card, not of the nurse using the 
glucometer. Evidence is required to show that there 
are no duplicate ID cards and that nurses never use 
other ID cards. If a nurse has mislaid their ID card, as it 
is clinically important to take glucometer readings, it 
seems likely they may borrow another card just to get 
their job done.  
No evidence was presented that the ID data was 
plausible. On the contrary, the database shows that 
10 nurse names are recorded as having more than 
one ID each (whether the named nurses use these IDs 
themselves or whether the duplicate IDs are more 
widely shared is impossible to say from the database 
alone); in fact, the database has 80 more IDs than 
nurse names. There is a staff ID management problem 
that in my view undermines the credibility of the 
electronic evidence. 
Each blood glucose reading in the database was 
associated with 35 other items of data: the patient 
name, number and gender, the staff identifier, the 
date, the ward, the temperature, the battery voltage, 
and so on. I suspect that the police only looked at the 
data they thought they directly needed for their 
investigation; it seems that they did not examine 
fields such as the error flags and alarms, or wonder 
why staff names were misspelt. They seemed to have 
no curiosity in the quality of the data. 
Unfortunately for the police, proving absent data is 
absent for a reason (e.g., fraud) is hard when the 
provenance and quality of the data is in question. 
Moreover, Excel spreadsheets support no way to 
audit them: it is impossible to tell whether cells, rows 
or columns have been deleted, been edited, or even 
have never existed. 
The police claimed they had used forensic methods to 
make copies of the database used in evidence. In fact, 
some evidence provided to me in several Comma 
Separated Value (CSV) files (an Excel data format) 
proved there had been manual intervention — Excel 
files also contained bits of police analysis along with 
the data. Because of their flexibility and lack of 
auditing, Excel and CSV are not the place to start if 
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you want to assure authenticity and integrity of 
evidence. 
In addition, the Abbott database itself was in a 
Structure Query Language (SQL) database, so 
somebody had converted it to Excel, and this is a 
manual process. Some of the Excel worksheets had 
differences that suggested an unreliable process had 
been used to create or edit them; certainly, they 
showed that the ‘forensic’ process had failed. 
The police had obtained and copied Excel 
spreadsheets at the hospital onto a Universal Serial 
Bus (‘USB’) external drive, (USB stick), but only then 
digitally signed the data and held it securely. This 
‘forensic rigour’ came too late: the police should have 
made a signed copy of the original database, not a 
manually created dump in CSV put on a USB stick. 
Anything could have happened to contaminate the 
Excel data earlier than the forensic process. There is 
no way to tell in Excel whether rows or columns been 
deleted or edited, and this could have happened 
before the data was put on the USB stick at the 
hospital or even by the police editing what was on the 
USB stick before it was securely copied. 
In addition, the police seized several blood 
glucometers from the ward in question and presented 
the data on them as evidence. The police failed to 
seize at least two other glucometers that the 
database showed had been docked on the ward over 
the period of the alleged fabrications but which were 
(presumably) in other wards or being serviced when 
the glucometers on the ward were seized. Note that 
the Abbott database records where glucometers are 
docked, not where the blood glucose tests are made 
— to know that, the test data needs to be related to 
correct patient and ward data. 
As figure 1 summarises (from the original data), 
glucometers move around the hospital. If a 
glucometer has a fault (e.g., a dead battery), it would 
be returned for servicing and replaced by another, 
and after finishing servicing it could be sent back 
anywhere in the hospital. If a nurse needed a 
glucometer but could not find one, they might borrow 
one from another ward. Glucometers may also get 
lost, perhaps at the back of a cupboard or sent off for 
repair. 
 
Figure 2. Diagram presented in court (anonymized) 
originally sized as A4; the smaller reproduction here 
serves to indicate the complexity of the network, but 
note that Box 8 in the figure contains unknown 
further software. The basic problem was that there 
were discrepancies between the paper records 
(bottom left) and the final computer records (bottom 
right). Note that not all relevant systems are Abbott’s 
(the ‘middleware’ box may, and probably does, 
contain further complications). Numbers in the figure 
were used to cross reference this diagram to other 
expert evidence. 
The police sent the glucometers they seized to Abbott 
to confirm that they worked correctly and to get 
copies of their data. Abbott said they worked 
correctly, though in my professional opinion their 
evidence was inconclusive on whether the 
glucometers had worked correctly at the material 
time. In the Excel data, glucometers were recorded as 
used almost hourly during the day on the ward, but 
some glucometers in the hospital were not used at all 
for over 100 days and many were not used at all for 
over a week. Nobody (so far as I could tell) knew 
where they were, and it is apparent that nobody used 
the database to locate where all the glucometers 
were that had ever been used on the ward so they 
could be correctly seized when the police attended 
the hospital. I do not think the hospital kept an 
inventory that tracked where glucometers were: if it 
had, it should have formed an essential part of the 
evidence. 
Since glucometers move around, and some of the 
relevant glucometers were not seized, it is possible 
that the missing data is still on various glucometers 
lost somewhere in the hospital (and which had not 
been docked before the database was copied by the 
police). They may still be sitting in a cabinet 
somewhere. 
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One file in eXtensible Markup Language (XML), 
disclosed by the prosecution in the second week of 
the trial showed a four year gap between a test 
measurement being taken and the data successfully 
transferred to the database. The alleged incidents 
happened less than four years before the trial, so this 
is suggestive that the missing data might have been 
still be on its way through the system — the alleged 
incidents did not happen that long before the trial. 
In my view, there was internal evidence in the 
database (e.g., the many error flags) that the data was 
of low quality, and there was the problem that there 
was no reliable forensic route from the original SQL 
database (let alone from the contents of the 
glucometer memories) to the Excel worksheets 
presented as evidence. By Abbott’s design, there was 
no reliable connection between the glucometers and 
the main database itself (e.g., there was no 
handshaking — the glucometers do not wait for the 
database to confirm receipt of data). If the Abbott 
Precision Web database never gets data the 
glucometer transmits, it seems nothing in the system 
notices and tries to rectify or warn about the problem. 
There were many failure points, for example — this 
list is not exhaustive (see also figures 2 and 3): 
(i) A glucometer may lose data. 
(ii) A glucometer may not be docked (it may 
not have been docked before the police seize 
data). 
(iii) A glucometer may be physically mislaid or 
returned for repair. 
(iv) Docking may fail, whether because of 
manual interference on the ward or by 
technical issues such as internet connectivity 
problems, unrecognized new servers and so 
on. 
(v) The glucometer battery may go flat. 
(vi) Abbott’s glucometers only store about 
2,000 readings, yet the database shows some 
were used for nearly 5,000 tests. Hence the 
data on the glucometers when they were sent 
to Abbott for checking says nothing about the 
tests more than 2,000 ago: they cannot 
provide evidence on what nurses did earlier 
than the glucometer records cover. 
(vii) The glucometers all look the same (and 
have tiny serial numbers), so you may just be 
looking at the wrong glucometer. I talked to 
some nurses and they did not realise the 
glucometers were different and that it could 
matter which ones were used. 
 
Figure 3. Diagram presented in court (anonymized) to 
show key sources of evidence. It was originally sized 
as A4 — for the present paper the details are less 
important than noting the complexity, in particular 
with no end-to-end checking of integrity. The police 
made digitally signed copies of Evidence 1, 2 and 3, 
but signing occurred after the police had manually 
copied the data, so it could only be used to show the 
data had not changed after it had been collected. The 
digital signatures did not assure that the data was 
what it was claimed to be. This diagram does not 
show Abbott’s modifications of data, which only 
became apparent after the diagram was submitted to 
the court. 
 
Figure 4. Side-by-side comparison of accepted glucose 
tests per day (left), with rejected tests per day (right) 
over the same period. Successful tests per day closely 
track patient numbers (e.g., note a dip in the August 
holiday period and another dip on Christmas day), but 
rejects show no obvious pattern, though one would 
assume rejects per day would correlate with the 
number of successful tests per day. In particular, note 
long periods of zero rejected tests and occasional 
brief periods of very high reject rates, almost double 
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the number of accepted tests. The obvious 
hypothetical explanation is that some records of 
rejected tests were deleted, some were merged, and 
possibly some dates were arbitrarily corrupted. The 
data itself does not provide any clues towards an 
explanation. 
Once docked, the data then has a tortuous route 
through servers, middleware and Abbott’s own 
software (figure 3). It can take days to get through. In 
particular, manual intervention is required for some 
data (e.g., when the patient ID is not valid somebody 
has to sort it out), but there was no evidence provided 
that any such manual corrections had occurred. 
Nobody, so far as I could tell, had sorted out this 
uncorrected data which remained in the database 
(technically, in a ‘reject folder’). 
Such problems have not been reported on national 
reporting databases to my knowledge (such as the 
United States of America’s Food and Drug 
Administration’s MAUDE),19 and the prosecution 
argued that because no problems had been reported 
it followed that similar problems did not occur 
elsewhere, and so it must follow that the problems 
were unique to this hospital and its nurses. However, 
there are peer-reviewed research papers that report 
identical problems at other hospitals using the same 
Abbott devices. These papers prove problems do 
occur but which are not reported to national 
reporting systems. One hospital that used their 
database to warn staff about poor practices saw 
improvements: in other words, not only is there 
research showing the same problems do occur 
elsewhere, but the same research also discusses 
solutions.20 The lack of evidence in national incident 
databases shows that hospitals are not reporting 
errors, not that errors do not happen. Arguably, 
electronic problems are routine and hospitals do not 
worry about them — except for research purposes or 
when they go to trial. 
Withdrawal of evidence  
During the trial, the prosecution produced new 
evidence on an encrypted CD with gigabytes of XML 
                                                          
19 MAUDE, the Manufacturer and User Facility Device Experience, 
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfmaude/search.
cfm . 
20 Gaurav Alreja, Namrate Setia, James Nichols, Liron Pantanowitz, 
‘Reducing patient identification errors related to glucose point-of-
care testing’, Journal of Pathology Informatics, 2:22, 2011. DOI: 
10.4103/2153-3539.80718, available at 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/21633490 . 
files. This was the first evidence I had been able to 
analyse that had metadata and timestamps covering 
the period of the alleged incidents. (Though, as 
before, there was no digital signature, which I could 
use to verify the data, or any other proof of 
provenance.) The court ordered the expert witnesses 
to analyse this data and prepare a joint report under 
Part 35.12(3) of the Civil Procedure Rules. 
The XML data was particularly interesting because the 
data contained timestamps, and the XML files 
themselves had creation dates that were plausible 
(the creation dates covered the relevant period — 
they were not dated, like the Excel spreadsheets had 
been, when the police created them but, rather, they 
were dated mostly at plausible times over the period 
of concern). The expert witnesses agreed a joint 
statement on the significance of the new data, though 
some parts of the report, covering different features 
of the data, were written separately. 
The prosecution’s case continued: the critical missing 
data was still not present. However, I noted that there 
were many indications that arbitrary data was 
missing, not just data related to specific nurses. I 
noted that the data had a very peculiar statistical 
distribution, strongly suggesting data 
mismanagement, errors, technical problems or 
similar. See figure 4 for one simple example from my 
analysis. Although I had (at least for the defence 
team) convincing arguments the data was unreliable, I 
had no good explanation why the data was unreliable. 
A witness from Abbott was called to be cross-
examined over the findings expressed in the joint 
report. During this cross-examination, it became clear 
that the witness had visited the hospital before the 
police had seized a copy of the data. It emerged that 
the witness for Abbott had ‘tidied up’ the database, 
and they had kept no records of what they had done. 
One should be clear that this was a naïve action, 
intended to be helpful, undertaken at the request of 
the hospital. 
This disclosure led to the judge excluding the 
evidence,21 and the case collapsed as the prosecution 
evidence was shown to have no probative value. The 
prosecution needed to prove that absent data was 
caused specifically by deliberate nurse behaviour, and 
                                                          
21 Ruling in R v Cahill; R v Pugh 14 October 2014, Crown Court at 
Cardiff, T20141094 and T20141061 before HHJ Crowther QC, 14 
Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review (2017) 67–
71. 
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they needed to prove that absence proved the nurses 
fabricated patient records. They were unable to do 
this. 
My many other arguments for the unreliability of the 
evidence were not raised or cross-examined before 
the jury. For example, the trial did not explore the 
consequences of the police seizing the wrong 
glucometers, of the hospital not having (or appearing 
not to have) any inventory for tracking glucometers. 
The court never explored the very poor data quality or 
reasons behind it (e.g., poor staff IDs), or why the 
error and alarm flags were set and what that implied 
for data quality. I would have liked to have shown, for 
instance, that the poor design of Abbott’s equipment 
could provide no evidentially acceptable relation 
between data absence and nurse behaviour, but the 
confession that Abbott had manipulated data (and not 
remembered exactly what they had done) was 
enough to undermine the prosecution case. 
Technical discussion  
The blood glucometers and related systems were not 
designed to be dependable. Or, to be more generous, 
they were not designed to be dependable given the 
well-known chaos of complex hospital IT systems 
involving many vendors, in the context of known 
clinical pressures, and of the known propensity of 
well-meaning staff to prioritise their clinical duties at 
all costs, even if that means performing workarounds 
to solve problems and overcome system hindrances. 
If the glucometers had been designed more 
dependably, they would have kept better records of 
successful (and failed) end-to-end blood test 
transmission. If they had, either the police would have 
had a very easy job (if the nurses had actually 
fabricated data) or the hospital would have easily 
known about the poor quality of their IT systems. 
Certainly, if the Abbott database had included 
confirmed transfer and missing data information, the 
police would have known immediately that the 
evidence was unreliable — though it will be recalled 
that they had not noticed error flags and other 
indicators of poor quality in the data they actually 
had. 
The written evidence from Abbott strongly suggested 
that the software in them was not of high quality: for 
example, they wrote in evidence ‘[…] we should 
hopefully be able to confirm that this meter also had 
no corrupt records.’ But ‘hopefully’ is not good 
enough. 
It is interesting that there are research papers 
showing the Abbott devices are accurate as 
glucometers.22 The prosecution understandably 
mentioned this, arguing that they were therefore 
good devices. But measurement accuracy was not 
relevant to this case. Regardless of whether the 
glucometers were accurate, the issue was recording 
the readings, not whether they were accurate 
readings. The relevant quality criterion for the case 
was whether the glucometers reliably transmitted test 
data to the hospital’s patient record system. I could 
find no published research exploring this aspect of 
their reliability — I would suggest from the experience 
reported in this paper that research in this area is 
needed.  
•••
 
Figure 5. Copy taken directly from Abbott’s 
PrecisionWeb Point of Care Data Management System 
User’s Manual (version QC Manager 3.0, 2009), page 
1-1. The nurses were doing what the manual says: 
they were using the point of care instrument (the 
glucometer) and writing down the results. 
Abbott’s database software has an explicit warning 
‘this product is not for diagnostic use’ (reproduced in 
figure 5). The question that I raise is, if it is not good 
enough for diagnostic use, why was it used for 
evidence? Why did the hospital even have software 
that was not for diagnostic use being used for 
managing patient databases? Rejected test data (e.g., 
with bad patient IDs, typically caused by using nurse 
IDs instead of patient IDs) has to be edited with this 
product; if that is not clinical use, what is it? 
To be sympathetic, the database might have originally 
been intended by the manufacturers purely for 
glucometer maintenance. For example, while I was 
double-checking my interpretation of the evidence, I 
                                                          
22 For example, see Karlijn Gijzen, David L. J. Moolenaar, Jos J. A. 
M. Weusten, Hendrik J. Pluim and Ayse Y. Demir, ‘Is there a suitable 
point-of-care glucose meter for tight glycemic control? Evaluation of 
one home-use and four hospital-use meters in an intensive care 
unit’, Journal of Clinical Chemistry and Laboratory Medicine, 
50(11):1985-92, 2012. DOI: 10.1515/cclm-2012-0104. 
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plotted the performance of the glucometers against 
their battery voltage and temperature. This is data the 
glucometers and the database record, and could be 
used by a hospital to help manage the glucometers — 
they could detect battery and other problems. The 
data I analysed was plausible, though there were 
interesting digitization effects.23 I could not tell 
whether this was how the glucometers actually 
worked or whether it was an artefact of the police 
processing the data through Abbott’s software, SQL or 
some effects inside Excel itself. The inability to tell 
where digitization errors occur is worrying, and raises 
suspicion of the ‘forensic’ processes used by the 
police. Analysing battery voltage reveals digitization is 
occurring but not where it is occurring. This might 
mean that digitization — or, other errors — also 
occurred in the evidence relevant to the criminal 
proceedings. 
Surely, if the data was not to be used for clinical 
purposes, then the police should have been very 
cautious in extrapolating the evidence to imply 
criminal clinical practice occurred: they should have 
used independent evidence to establish the records 
were reliable evidence for their purposes. The police 
assumed the glucometers and hospital IT systems 
were completely reliable,24 even though they knew 
they must require human intervention to be managed 
by the hospital. The police did not question the 
management of the data,25 and there was no evidence 
submitted about the day-to-day management of the 
data. Possibly nobody was managing it! In addition, 
the Abbott systems themselves required human work 
to develop in the first place, and that human process, 
too, was unlikely to be infallible. 
Evidence indicated that the Abbott database system 
crashed frequently — a problem the court never 
examined, because the judge excluded the evidence 
before we needed to draw this issue to the court’s 
                                                          
23 For example, a battery voltage of 3.4 volts may be digitized to and 
recorded as 3 or to 4 volts, depending on how the data is processed. 
The result is, instead of a continual range of voltage 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, 
etc, there may be strange jumps 3 to 4 that have nothing to do with 
the glucometer but are caused by Excel or other data processing 
systems. (Almost certainly numbers will be digitized in binary rather 
than decimal as illustrated here.) 
24 Despite the text of chapter 6 of Electronic Evidence, which was 
first introduced into the second edition in 2010. This suggests none 
of the Crown Prosecution lawyers or police officers were aware of 
this book. 
25 Tests for authentication are set out in Electronic Evidence at 
7.128. These tests have been up-dated and improved upon since 
the first edition in 2007 and are now incorporated into the Draft 
Convention on Electronic Evidence, for which see 13 Digital 
Evidence and Electronic Signatures Review (2016) S1 – S11. 
attention.26 If, as was clear from the evidence, the 
system was regularly crashing, then this was another 
proof that it was not very reliable, and of course it 
was likely to be losing data or failing to record data 
when it crashed. If so, the alleged fabrication would 
be explained in yet another way. Such an argument 
would put an obligation on Abbott to explain how 
their systems were (if indeed they were) reliably 
storing all relevant data despite the crashes. 
The Abbott systems are regulated devices and have 
appropriate CE marks,27 but CE marking is a very 
coarse regulatory requirement and says little about 
dependability, particularly for use in the context of 
the multi-vendor networked environment of a typical 
hospital. 
It seems the hospital, as well as the police, 
unconsciously assumed all the data was perfectly 
reliable, and sufficiently reliable for a criminal 
investigation. Nobody consciously said, ‘we are 
assuming the data is reliable’ — it never crossed their 
mind to state their assumptions; there is no English 
word to describe an assumption you are acting on but 
do not know you are assuming. The hospital, police 
and Crown Prosecution lawyers made critical 
assumptions, but they were not aware any such 
assumptions had been made. It did not occur to them 
that these assumptions, if acknowledged, could easily 
have been checked. 
Subsequent disciplinary hearing  
Internal disciplinary processes were suspended during 
the course of the trial. Resuming the internal 
disciplinary process to discipline one nurse, the 
discredited police evidence was reused as if it was 
unproblematic. The disciplinary hearings presented a 
misunderstanding:28 
‘in an internal disciplinary proceedings the 
burden of proof is a lower threshold than in 
criminal proceedings …’  
A disciplinary hearing may be interested in issues that 
are not considered criminal, and for such issues the 
                                                          
26 Ruling in R v Cahill; R v Pugh 14 October 2014, Crown Court at 
Cardiff, T20141094 and T20141061 before HHJ Crowther QC, 14 
Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review (2017) 67–
71. 
27 The letters ‘CE’ appear on many products traded on the extended 
Single Market in the European Economic Area (EEA). They signify 
that products sold in the EEA have been assessed to meet relevant 
safety, health, and environmental protection requirements. 
28 The disciplinary hearing records were made available to me by a 
nurse, but are not public. 
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burden of proof can be lighter since the issues are less 
serious. However, in the present case, the rigorous 
standards of the criminal process discredited the 
evidence thoroughly. The court established that the 
evidence had no value, and properly understood, the 
data had no value even for a disciplinary process 
(other than, perhaps, for an investigation into the way 
the hospital dealt with devices and systems controlled 
by software). 
Consider: 
‘The [disciplinary] investigation looked on [the 
database] to verify if this blood glucose had 
been taken for this patient. This is not verified 
on [the database] … [the disciplinary hearing 
concludes that the] patient did not have 9 
blood sugar recordings checked [by this 
nurse] … [etc]’ 
Indeed, words like ‘this is not verified on [the 
database]’ is a recurring phrase in the disciplinary 
transcripts, yet we know that Abbott’s engineer had 
deleted this data and therefore it is inappropriate to 
infer anything about what any nurse actually did from 
this data. The database errors also affected about 70 
other nurses similarly, so it is hard to understand this 
as an issue about the one nurse in the disciplinary 
hearing. 
I submitted written evidence to the hearing, including 
quoting from the judge’s Ruling:29 
‘Professor Thimbleby has shown that the 
chain has various breaks where the data can 
be lost. None of the data now relied on is 
original; it was all made after human 
intervention by [the Abbott engineer] and he 
has no real recollection of what he was asked 
to do, what ID codes he was asked to 
consider, and did not note it at the time. All 
the material is at best edited. CH20 [the 
Precision Web database evidence] has lost 
significant amounts of data: but there is no 
way to tell whether the missing files were 
reintegrated into the PrecisionWeb database, 
in which case the Prosecution case might have 
force, or simply deleted, in which case it 
would not. I should exclude the evidence as 
being more prejudicial than probative or I 
                                                          
29 Ruling in R v Cahill; R v Pugh 14 October 2014, Crown Court at 
Cardiff, T20141094 and T20141061 before HHJ Crowther QC, 14 
Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review (2017) 67–
71. 
should consider it hearsay because of [the 
Abbott engineer’s] intervention, and 
unreliable hearsay. 
[…] their adduction in evidence would serve 
only to suggest to the jury a conclusion they 
could not draw – namely, that absence in the 
searches meant those results had never been 
in PrecisionWeb or the reject folder.’ 
It is worth adding that the prosecution experts also 
agreed with the judge’s Ruling. The disciplinary 
process, however, drew a conclusion the judge said a 
jury could not. 
The hospital argued I had analysed evidence admitted 
into criminal legal proceedings, and not data 
belonging to the hospital. At any stage, the hospital 
could have compared the police evidence against 
their copies of the database to establish whether the 
problems affected the court alone and not the 
disciplinary proceedings as well. Either the data would 
be the same (in which case my arguments would be 
valid), or the discrepancies should have led to 
investigations on data management practices: why (if 
it was the case) were the police handed corrupt data 
different from the data the hospital retained? If I had 
been analysing different data, that again calls into 
question the integrity of the hospital database — if 
the police’s forensic methods had seized invalid data, 
perhaps the hospital’s internal procedures would have 
the same problems? On any interpretation, in my 
view, any nurse-specific conclusions drawn from the 
data were invalid. 
Discussion  
The big picture is that nobody seems to be fully aware 
of the complexity and risks of IT. This results in lax 
legislation, lax regulation and lax procurement, and, in 
turn, lax manufacturing since no useful standard of 
quality can be demanded by hospitals. Unawareness, 
in turn, results in lax management, and unnoticed 
inconsistencies between clinical care and its 
unreliable monitoring, and so on. 
Prominent peer-reviewed papers reinforce this 
naïvety30 — they give the impression that glucometers 
just measure blood glucose levels and ignore that 
                                                          
30 James H. Nichols, ‘Blood glucose testing in the hospital: Error 
sources and risk management,’ Journal of Diabetes Science and 
Technology, 5(1): 173–177, 2011, available at 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/21303641 . 
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readings have to be reliably networked and recorded 
in databases. Even the recent 2016 UK Making IT 
Work report31 (the Wachter Report) takes it for 
granted that computers work32 (with minor caveats on 
interoperability and usability) — hospitals, apparently, 
just need to ‘digitalise’ more, with a new government 
investment (£4.2 billion) available to purchase IT. The 
report takes it for granted there is good IT that can 
just be purchased. The Wachter Report has a ‘digital 
maturity’ scale, but it is about whether and to what 
extent a hospital has adopted levels of IT (and is paper 
free), not whether the IT and its management is 
effective or even fit for purpose, which is just 
assumed. Every hospital is in good company, then, 
unwittingly drifting into cyber-failure.33 
Ironically, if the hospital in the story here had been 
‘paper free’ (as the recent Wachter Report wants) 
there would have been no discrepancies to 
investigate; although there would have been no trial, 
the underlying IT problems would never have come to 
light. If we want a paper-free health service, we 
urgently need to work out how to make it more 
reliable. 
Failure only becomes apparent after there is a visible 
incident. In the case described here, something 
initiated the police investigation and discrepancies 
between paper and IT then became ‘the incident’. In 
hospitals, reportable incidents usually involve patient 
harm or near misses of harm; in this case, thankfully, 
there was no patient harm but considerable staff 
harm. But without paper, there would have been no 
visible incident. 
With hindsight, we can see there were many causes of 
the incident. All were avoidable; and avoiding only a 
few would have resulted in a much happier outcome. 
The wholly uncritical view of IT coupled with a 
remarkable unwillingness to consider alternative 
explanations for multiple IT problems related to so 
many nurses are textbook examples of baseline 
shifting, confirmation bias, and cognitive 
dissonance.34 With so many nurses apparently 
implicated, underlying systemic factors, including 
                                                          
31 Robert M. Wachter, Making IT Work: Harnessing the Power of 
Health Information Technology to Improve Care in England (Report 
of the National Advisory Group on Health Information Technology in 
England, 2016). 
32 Despite the evidence set out in detail in chapter 6 of Electronic 
Evidence. 
33 Sidney Dekker, Drift into failure: From hunting broken components 
to understanding complex systems (CRC Press, 2011). 
34 Mistakes Were Made (But Not by Me): Why We Justify Foolish 
Beliefs, Bad Decisions, and Hurtful Acts. 
management35 and IT support should also have been 
obvious priorities to critically examine. 
Other hospitals will have analogous complex IT 
problems. A priority everywhere should be to have a 
mature cybersecurity strategy, which implies having 
an implementation of IT that permits having a 
workable strategy — and there needs to be a 
regulatory requirement on manufacturers to supply 
equipment that is reliable enough to support the 
strategy. Effective procedures must be in place to 
detect, interpret and respond to unusual or 
unauthorized activity immediately. In the case here, 
data was deleted and corrupted, and the hospital did 
not notice. Hospitals need to tighten up their 
cybersecurity monitoring, which should be able to 
detect such incidents, whether caused by external or 
internal hacking. Good guidance on data management 
is available elsewhere.36 
Over a long period of time, the hospital staff (nurses, 
management, IT management, etc) ignored evidence 
of behaviour that the police later treated as criminal; 
that is, the recording of tests on the database 
apparently had no day-to-day significance (else 
somebody would have noticed years earlier that it 
was not working). When data was deleted, the 
hospital did not notice. The police assumed the 
corrupt data was perfect, and formed adequate 
evidence to charge nurses. There were many reasons 
that the data was unreliable, but the simplest was 
that Abbott had corrupted large parts of it. That fact 
alone was sufficient for the trial to collapse. 
Once the police investigation started, my impression 
was that the hospital felt unable to pursue any 
parallel investigation, and certainly they felt unable to 
help me as an expert witness in my technical 
enquiries. This missed early opportunities to uncover 
some of the systemic problems. A parallel 
investigation asking the question “why is the data 
corrupt?”, carried out within the hospital, would have 
saved a significant waste of time and huge costs to 
the defendants and to the hospital. 
Unfortunately, it is easy to blame people trying to use 
bad technology. Blaming nurses makes a compelling 
                                                          
35 Jane E. Ball, Trevor Murrells, Anne Marie Rafferty, Elizabeth 
Morrow, and Peter Griffiths, ‘Care left undone during nursing shifts: 
Associations with workload and perceived quality of care,’ British 
Medical Journal Quality & Safety, 0:1–10, 2013. DOI:10.1136/bmjqs-
2012-001767 , available at 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/23898215 . 
36 Data safety guidance. 
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tabloid story, involving simple human failings we think 
we understand. We so quickly feel angry about poor 
patient care, and feel a sense of betrayal by nurses 
being incompetent that it is hard to explore other 
explanations. Unfortunately, it is difficult to form a 
compelling story about complex and unreliable IT 
systems, because people will not generally 
understand the intricate truth.  
There is no quick fix, other than getting relevant 
experts involved, which of course depends on 
recognising that experts are needed. Dekker discusses 
these important issues in much more detail than we 
can here.37 
Conclusions  
While the hospital had a core part to play in this story, 
we ought to consider the device and the data 
systems. Manufacturers have years to develop and 
produce better IT; they have many years to develop 
hospital equipment, and they should know how to do 
it. Arguably, then, their equipment should be reliable 
to use correctly in a real ward in a real hospital, along 
with its existing complex networks and database 
systems. It should be easy to monitor patient data and 
ward activity and adherence to standard procedures. 
In contrast to the manufacturers, the hospital and 
nurses in particular have a very time-pressurized, 
clinical job to do, and it is reasonable that they rely on 
the quality of regulated products marketed by 
reputable, international manufacturers. It should not 
be the job of nurses (or even of disciplinary processes) 
to figure out what is wrong with hospital IT. 
Arguably, it should not be the police’s main job to 
figure out intrinsically faulty IT either, although the 
VW scandal38 and other examples should urge a more 
careful approach. Nevertheless, the police have years 
to pursue an investigation, in contrast to the nurses 
who have literally seconds to do their job. The police 
should use their relaxed time more cautiously, 
something the nurses cannot interrupt their patient 
care to do. 
The manufacturers argued in court that because their 
products were regulated and CE marked, any 
                                                          
37 Sidney W. A. Dekker, ‘Prosecuting professional mistake: 
Secondary victimization and a research agenda for criminology,’ 
International Journal of Criminal Justice Sciences, 4(1): 60–78, 
2009. 
38 For an overview, see 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Volkswagen_emissions_scandal . 
problems must be the nurses’ fault. This is an attitude 
that misdirects attention from improving systems to 
blaming users. Industry needs to move from saying 
‘users make mistakes’ to saying ‘users make mistakes 
so we must make better systems.’ In the case here, 
serious mistakes were made in the back-office by the 
manufacturer’s representative, not by any end users 
or nurses, and underlying those mistakes were system 
design errors that allowed those mistakes to remain 
unnoticed. 
It is clear that the regulatory environment is not fit for 
purpose. In contrast to IT-based medical devices, 
pharmaceutical regulation requires that drugs are 
safely developed and tested and that problems (such 
as side-effects) are reported. IT regulation has not 
caught up, despite the significant impact of IT on 
healthcare — not just in direct patient care, but in 
auditing, finance, and all areas of healthcare, even in 
incident reporting and, ironically, in pharmaceutical 
regulation. For hospitals, effective IT regulation is 
more critical than pharmaceutical regulation. 
While hospital IT regulation may not change soon, 
given the well-known unreliability of IT generally, it is 
surprising the police were not more cautious in 
interpreting the electronic evidence. The data 
corruption underlying this case could have been 
detected and managed as soon as problems occurred, 
had the hospital had a mature approach to 
cybersecurity (or had the manufacturers designed the 
system to be monitored reliably). The police got 
involved in a problem that had escalated because the 
hospital had not been monitoring its data. 
Given the widespread use of poor IT throughout 
healthcare, hoping for manufacturers to improve is 
perhaps less realistic than encouraging hospitals to 
prioritize mature cybersecurity and better 
procurement. They need to do this because effective 
cybersecurity measures are protective against a wide 
range of problems, including all of the problems 
discussed in this paper. Fortunately, cybersecurity 
already has a high profile (thanks to widespread fear 
of malicious hacking, and thanks to high-profile cases 
like WannaCry): this paper adds more reasons to take 
it seriously. It is not just about attacks, loss of data 
and downtime, but about understanding. 
The broader problem is the uncritical acceptance of 
IT, from legal, regulatory, procurement and other 
perspectives, especially for healthcare, where billions 
of pounds are eagerly invested in new IT. Our culture 
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makes us all uncritically believe that IT and especially 
the latest IT is wonderful — don’t we all want new 
things?39 (Of course, this is how IT companies stay in 
business.) However, the reality is that behind the 
façade of superficial wonder, modern hospital IT is too 
complicated for its own good, for the good of 
patients, and for the good of staff. Ironically, the 
newer IT is, and the more exciting it seems, the less 
tested it seems to be in the clinical environment. 
This awestruck culture nurtures a lax approach to 
cybersecurity, which created the perfect environment 
(bad IT, bad IT management) for accepting a 
superficial explanation of alleged multiple nurse 
failures instead of exploring underlying causes in the 
IT and its management. 
 
© Harold Thimbleby, 2018 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
39 Harold Thimbleby, ‘Trust me — I’m a computer,’ Future 
Healthcare Journal, 4(2):105 – 108, 2017. DOI: 
10.7861/futurehosp.4-2-105; this includes lawyers, for which see 
Electronic Evidence, chapter 6. 
Appendix 
Sample recommendations 
The list of recommendations below is divided into 
sections of recommendations primarily focused on 
hospital, police, manufacturer, regulator and 
researcher interests. Cybersecurity and IT are 
dynamic, ever-changing areas, and any specific list of 
recommendations is bound to become obsolete and 
eventually become counter-productive. 
There is no particular order of priority in the following 
recommendations. They should all be read. The 
recommendations should inspire your thinking: if you 
spot errors or omissions, then you are thinking about 
the issues, and that is the aim (and please email me 
any insights). The recommendations should not be 
read as criticisms — they are to encourage 
constructive thought; good cybersecurity is not easy. 
(1) IT governance. Everyone (hospitals, police, 
lawyers) should put in place processes to continually 
review and update their cybersecurity and IT 
maturity. Hospitals should have board level 
cybersecurity expertise and responsibility — 
remember that a cybersecurity incident can put a 
hospital out of action in seconds. Note that the GDPR 
makes much of this a legal requirement. Elsewhere 
we have published advice40 but it must be emphasised 
that is dated 2018, and continual review of 
cybersecurity is essential, for instance by using the 
resources at the UK GCHQ National Cyber Security 
Centre, including their training and certificated 
courses.41 
(2) Risk assessment and safety cases. All projects 
(whether installing new IT or investigating IT) should 
include an explicit IT and cybersecurity risk 
assessment. Procurement should insist on seeing 
appropriate documentation from suppliers. 
(3) Continual review and training. IT is used to support 
an organization and to help deliver its products. For 
example, manufacturers require IT to function, and 
their products contain IT. Police require IT to function, 
and their investigations may involve IT. Hospitals 
require IT to function, and patient safety depends on 
reliable IT systems. Both aspects of cybersecurity and 
                                                          
40 ‘Six Factors Essential for Mitigating Cyber Risks in Healthcare’. 
41 https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/guidance.  
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IT maturity must be continually reviewed, and not 
only reviewed but supported with adequate training. 
(4) External oversight. Internal reviews are 
inadequate, as they may merely perpetuate existing 
blindspots. Those people in positions of authority 
should formally engage professional external and 
independent oversight, and collaborate closely with 
colleagues nationally and internationally to learn and 
share best practice. Shneiderman makes a strong 
argument for independent external oversight of all 
algorithms, not just healthcare systems.42 
(5) Resourcing. Cybersecurity, improvement and 
culture change is at least a full-time job. Avoiding 
predictable future problems and catastrophes 
requires dedicated staff and investment. Mature 
cybersecurity cannot be achieved alone, but requires 
continual collaboration across the healthcare sector 
and beyond — it should be a national priority, and 
local leaders need to be networking in this wider 
community just to stay up to date. This paper only 
discusses ‘simple’ point of care equipment, but 
cybersecurity necessarily covers everything from wall-
mounted emergency equipment, implants, medical 
apps, linear accelerators to PCs, all susceptible to 
hacking, ransomware, trojans and viruses — as well as 
all staff education (personal apps, phishing risks, etc). 
(6) Digital and investigative skills. All investigations 
should understand statistics, data fishing, and 
question IT reliability — is the data reliable; does it 
pass statistical tests? One can use data (especially bad 
data) to support almost any case if the baseline is 
ignored. 
(7) Thinking out of the box. IT is developing rapidly 
and changing the rules. Reliance on law or regulation 
to inform IT decisions is naïve. Cyberattacks succeed 
by surprise, which means to defend against IT 
problems, we must defend against people who do not 
play by rules. Ironically, the poor understanding of the 
problems created by the software systems that had to 
be managed manually initiated off this prosecution 
did not surprise anybody, because nobody was alert. 
What hospitals should consider  
(1) Hospitals should continually monitor all data for 
cybersecurity anomalies and attacks. Basic security 
                                                          
42 Ben Shneiderman, ‘Opinion: The dangers of faulty, biased, or 
malicious algorithms requires independent oversight’, Proceedings 
of the National Academy of Sciences, 113(48):13538-13540, 2016. 
DOI 10.1073/pnas.1618211113 . 
protocols, if in place, would have raised alarms at 
Abbott’s tampering with the data (or any other 
unexpected or unwanted changes) as and when it 
happened. 
(2) It is routine for hospitals to perform clinical audits; 
IT audits should be routine too; ideally audits should 
be undertaken with external oversight. Hospitals 
should audit their data and monitor it. In the case 
described here, a hospital collected data it did not 
monitor, so deleting or otherwise tampering with the 
clinical data was not detected when it happened. 
(3) Hospitals should procure equipment with reliable 
IT. In the case here, a hospital procured equipment 
that unreliably recorded clinical procedures. The legal 
department should be aware of the failings with 
software, and ought to ensure such failings are 
properly dealt with in the formation of contracts. 
There are many standards for helping improve 
procurement processes.43 
(4) Hospitals should disable all IT systems and 
features they are not using. They should not install 
software that is not used or monitored, and they 
should resist police attempts to seize data which they 
cannot verify is accurate. 
(5) A hospital should not have systems supporting 
clinical work that are expressly designed as not for 
clinical use; they should only be used with proper 
caution. Investigations should never rely on such 
systems without independent verification that they 
are appropriate for the specific purposes of the 
investigation. 
(6) When police request data from a hospital, proper 
governance procedures should be followed. One of 
the problems with the case in this instance is that the 
police obtained evidence without oversight; neither 
the hospital nor the court had any idea what 
evidence the police had. 
(7) Hospitals, police and lawyers should realize that 
the research literature does not tell the whole story 
of whether equipment is appropriate for clinical use. 
Clinical research papers focus on a very narrow 
aspect of dependability (e.g., whether measurements 
are clinically accurate), but real use is more 
complicated (e.g., whether measurements get 
processed reliably in multi-vendor systems). 
                                                          
43 Brian Donnelly, International Code of Practice for Providing 
Technology Enabled Care Services (Troubador Publishing, 2018). 
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(8) Hospitals should routinely and regularly disclose 
to staff what data they are collecting. They should 
allow staff to see and, if necessary, to challenge it 
and the processes used to collect it. This means 
releasing data regularly. If data has no clinical role, 
then it should never be allowed to be used. 
(9) Evidence discredited in the rigour of a criminal 
trial should be used to help understand the causes of 
the system failures. It should not be used with in 
disciplinary processes. A likely failure in the case here 
was that the hospital did not do a thorough post-trial 
review: what went wrong, what could be learned?  
(10) Hospitals should be aware that trials can collapse 
or terminate for any reason before all evidence is 
presented. For example, in the present case, once it 
was known that the database had been corrupted 
the trial collapsed, and further evidence (such as 
problems with staff IDs, wrong glucometers seized, 
and so on) was never raised. Working with the 
consultants and expert witnesses after a case will 
reveal information and insights that never reached 
the trial. 
(11) Hospitals should also consider recommendations 
in all other sections in this paper (and elsewhere); 
hospitals should not work alone and be unaware of 
the activities and concerns of the wider community 
working to help improve IT and cybersecurity. 
(12) Performing reviews after incidents is important, 
but such reviews should be externally chaired or 
assessed by experts. Internal reviews that followed 
this prosecution have responded by noting that ‘we 
have since replaced […]’s system with a wifi-based 
system, so there is no problem’ — yet the problem 
was nothing to do with the network, wired or wifi, 
but with failures in management and a basic 
understanding of IT. 
(13) When something go wrong, everything has gone 
wrong — every defence failed to stop the incident. 
This is the vital message of James Reason’s Swiss 
Cheese Model44 — things go wrong when every 
defence fails. Nurses are one defence, but so too are 
management systems, training, supervision – and IT 
systems. Hence if things fail, then do not just treat it 
as a personnel disciplinary issue. Another of Reason’s 
insights is that if something goes wrong, if anybody 
could have made the same mistake and it leads to 
                                                          
44 James T. Reason, Human Error (Cambridge University Press, 
1991). 
the same incident, then there is a problem with the 
system and not that particular person. So if 70 people 
make the same mistake, what we might call ‘Reason’s 
Law’ says it is a system problem. (Of course, some 
nurses in the 70 might have been negligent, but it is 
unlikely all of them were). This ‘Reason Law’ is 
implemented in the NHS’s Just Culture Guide, where 
it is called the substitution test (would anyone else 
substituted from the same peer group be likely to do 
the same things?)45 
(14) There is growing acknowledgement that 
hospitals should move away from a blame culture to 
a just culture.46 With a rapid focus on blame, 
hospitals may fail to learn more general lessons, and 
hence fail to improve; the important insight is that 
when clinicians are blamed, that is not the end of the 
story, and it is rarely the place to start. The 
temptation to discipline or sack an individual creates 
the impression the problem is solved, but doing so 
discounts the underlying causes (such as IT failures) 
and the importance of addressing the causes and not 
just the symptoms. Just culture is usually associated 
with patient safety investigations, but it applies to 
any investigation, and could have applied in the 
present case, and I believe would have resulted in a 
more constructive process. 
(15) Review all IT governance and resourcing. 
What the police should consider  
(1) The police failed to have a critical approach to 
data analysis. There were many simpler explanations 
for the alleged fabrications by 70 nurses: for 
example, computer problems, a vendetta in the back 
office, poor data management, faulty equipment, 
faulty networks, and more. The police should 
routinely assess alternative hypotheses, and provide 
evidence they have done so. 
(2) The police never considered assessing the internal 
or external validity of their evidence. A cursory 
analysis of the database would have raised many 
questions about its quality. 
(3) The police management of data exposed 
numerous IT problems. For example, one piece of 
evidence indicated that the police found that their 
Excel crashed analyzing the data. It is surprising the 
                                                          
45 NHS Improvement, A Just Culture Guide, 2018, available at 
https://improvement.nhs.uk/resources/just-culture-guide . 
46 Sidney Dekker, Just Culture: Balancing Safety and Accountability 
(Ashgate, 2007). 
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police even tried using Excel to analyze the complex 
relations in such a large volume of data. 
(4) There was no clear management of the evidence. 
Evidence I was given included spreadsheets 
(including police analysis in the spreadsheets), which 
made me wonder what other edits the police had 
made to what was claimed to be evidence. Despite 
the ‘forensic’ methods the police claimed to use, they 
were not presented with the evidence and did not 
help confirm provenance. 
(5) Data discrepancies were used as evidence, so I 
was surprised at typographical errors affecting data 
presented in the prosecution evidence — this is 
ironic, as the prosecution case relied on the quality of 
data. Of course, I may have made some typographical 
errors in my own evidence that I did not notice. (I 
used Mathematica to analyze the data and 
automatically generate reports, tables and diagrams, 
etc: insofar as I can program reliably, and I more than 
double-checked every result. This ensured my reports 
were factually accurate.) 
(6) The police seized several glucometers. As other 
glucometers had been used on the ward, not all of 
the relevant glucometers were seized. Had the trial 
proceeded, this would have become a criticism of the 
prosecution case — it is possible that the alleged 
fabrications are still stored on a misplaced 
glucometer somewhere. The implication is that the 
police were inadequately aware of clinical practice 
and did not engage with the hospital to help seize the 
correct equipment. 
(7) What was the ward supposed to do when they 
lost their glucometers to the police? The police 
should do a risk analysis, because removing 
glucometers from a ward puts patients at serious risk 
of harm (ironically at greater risk than the alleged 
incidents). 
(8) There were surprising conflicts of interest.47 A 
technician from the manufacturer corrupted data, 
then selected the data from the hospital and handed 
it over to the police, and the police sent the 
glucometers to the manufacturer to analyze and 
confirm whether they were functioning correctly. 
Independent experts should have been used 
throughout. In fact, the police used consultants with 
narrow terms of reference; if the consultants had 
                                                          
47 Linda Geddes, ‘Evidence of failure,’ New Scientist, 3175:22–23, 
28 April, 2018. 
worked with the expert witnesses, the case might 
have been avoided. 
(9) As the manufacturer’s glucometers do not use an 
open architecture, independent experts should have 
been required to be present when the data was 
taken from the hospital and when any glucometer 
analysis was performed. 
(10) Knowing glucometers function correctly when 
analyzed tells you little about how they might have 
performed in the past. (For example, the glucometers 
may have been serviced since the incidents, so they 
work well now but did not before they were 
serviced.) The police made no attempt to establish 
whether the glucometers worked correctly at the 
material time — and the logs the glucometers 
recorded seemed to offer no help here. 
(11) It did not appear that the ACPO Good Practice 
Guide for Digital Evidence (March 2012, v5) were 
followed by the police.48 
What regulators should consider  
(1) The very public discovery of VW’s fraudulent IT to 
help their cars pass emission tests49 — which became 
public during the trial — should serve as a powerful 
reminder that IT is not just unreliable, but that it may 
be unreliable intentionally. VW’s illegal emission 
levels are estimated to have contributed to tens of 
excess premature deaths. Manufacturers (particularly 
of healthcare products) should adopt processes that 
reassure users or the public more generally that they 
are reliable, for instance by using open source 
methods so that their code can be externally vetted. 
(2) Formal methods should be required in design and 
development of hospital IT systems.50 Manufacturers 
may complain that they do not know how to use 
formal methods for their complex products. They 
should start making products that are simple enough 
for them to understand. Logically, if the 
manufacturers can only ‘hope’ to understand their 
                                                          
48 Available at http://library.college.police.uk/docs/acpo/digital-
evidence-2012.pdf . 
49 Russell Hotten, ‘Volkswagen: The scandal explained,’ BBC News, 
10 December 2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-34324772 
; Electronic Evidence, 6.139. 
50 There is significant literature on formal methods. For instance, 
see, M. D. Harrison, M. Drinnan, J. C. Campos, P. Masci, L. Freitas, 
C. di Maria and M. Whitaker, ‘Safety Analysis of Software 
Components of a Dialysis Machine Using Model Checking’, 
Proceedings International Conference on Formal Aspects of 
Component Software, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, volume 
10487:137-154 (Springer Verlag, 2017). DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-
68034-7_8. 
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own devices (e.g., failing to use formal methods 
means relying on hope alone), then non-technical 
hospitals and nurses are very unlikely to understand 
them either. 
(3) It is notable that regulation is primarily concerned 
with patient health; staff well-being (and hospital 
effectiveness) clearly ought to be a consideration. 
(4) The CE marking system, which is used to indicate 
products meet the relevant requirements of the 
European Medical Device Directives, is discredited,51 
and fixing it to be more effective for complex 
computer-based systems (devices, medical apps, etc) 
is essential, particularly as computer-based 
technology is ubiquitous, and rapidly taking over 
healthcare. Healthcare IT systems (PC, tablet, 
embedded, point of care, etc) support patient care, 
and it is therefore negligent if they are not developed 
using equivalent processes to the rigorous processes 
used in pharmaceutical development. 
(5) In our complex world of IT threats, regulation 
urgently needs to be more open, and more 
responsive to legitimate concerns. 
(6) There are rigorous processes in pharma because 
we recognize that there may be side-effects and 
unknown variation in patients — analogous problems 
to IT and cybersecurity. Randomized controlled trials 
as used in pharma may not be the essential 
methodology for cybersecurity, but there are other 
methodologies such as formal methods where 
correctness is proved. Such methods should be used, 
and must be shown to be used in any certified 
product. Formal methods are routine in aviation 
(where lives depend on them); they ought to be 
routine in healthcare (where lives depend on them). 
(7) To become a nurse to use equipment like blood 
glucometers requires a minimum of three years 
degree level training, plus registering with the 
Nursing and Midwifery Council. You can then become 
a registered nurse. You also need to pursue continual 
professional development throughout your career. As 
a registered nurse, you have a legally protected title. 
It baffles me that to develop anything a nurse uses, 
you could start this afternoon with no qualifications 
                                                          
51 Deborah Cohen, ‘How a fake hip showed up failings in European 
device regulation,’ British Medical Journal, 345:e7090, DOI: 
10.1136/bmj.e7090, 2012, available at 
https://www.bmj.com/content/345/bmj.e7090 ; Deborah Cohen and 
Matthew Billingsley, ‘Europeans are left to their own devices,’ British 
Medical Journal, 342:d2748, 2011. DOI: 10.1136/bmj.d2748, 
available at https://www.bmj.com/content/342/bmj.d2748.long . 
whatsoever, yet doing a job like programming a 
glucometer is doing something as life-critical as 
nursing — actually, more so, as your glucometer 
could harm millions of patients. If you are building 
equipment that professionals use, surely you ought 
to have qualifications to confirm your competence? 
This requirement would be a simple regulatory 
change, and would be welcomed as it would give 
qualified developers higher salaries and give 
manufacturers assurance they were building 
dependable systems. 
(8) I would change the law, so that if a manufacturer 
cannot provide a complete log of all data it has 
processed (with appropriate forensic checks), then 
the presumption is that the manufacturer is liable for 
lost or corrupted data. 
What manufacturers should consider  
(1) Manufacturers should employ (or out-source to) 
developers with adequate qualifications. See point 
(7) above. 
(2) Hospital IT systems are very complex (through no 
particular fault of the manufacturer cited in this 
article) and this complexity is not going to change. In 
view of the complexity, manufacturers must develop 
more defensive software — for instance with end-to-
end checking, more logging and diagnostics, and with 
formal proofs of correctness. Auditing needs to be 
provided, work and be used. 
(3) Installed software in hospitals that is not being 
actively managed (as happened here with Abbott’s 
database) should be automatically reported, at least 
to the manufacturer who can then take remedial 
steps (such as reconfiguring it or notifying the 
hospital to audit it). 
(4) The equipment in this case was CE marked. This 
implied that any problems must be the nurses’ fault. 
With regulations in place of this nature, there is little 
incentive for manufacturers to try harder. 
Manufacturers of clinical products should closely 
consider the quality of their programming, and the 
whole system of CE marks should be more 
transparent, and lawyers should be willing to test the 
efficacy of products with CE marks. 
(5) It should be routine for manufacturers to be 
required to disclose relevant quality control 
documents and risk analyses in support of any claims 
their products work to specification (e.g., as required 
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by the relevant international standards ISO 15197, 
ISO 14971, ISO 13485, etc). 
(6) It was disappointing that in this particular case, no 
technical experts from the manufacturer wanted to 
appear in court, although they provided much 
written evidence to the prosecution. Manufacturers 
should be eager to support investigations concerning 
their products. 
(7) The widespread poor design of user interfaces 
suggests that reliable operation was not a priority or 
perhaps not a competency for the manufacturer. The 
evidence presented in court suggested the quality of 
the programming of the device and the database 
management software was an issue, and the 
database systems regularly crashed. Given the 
serious consequences of poor quality systems 
(patient harm, substandard care, pressure on staff — 
even prison) manufacturers should feel an obligation 
to put high quality professional effort into their 
products. 
(8) Abbott’s systems have what they called an ‘audit’ 
feature. It certainly has a feature called audit, but it is 
manual and fallible, and generated documents that 
are not authenticated. Features should be named 
and implemented to support the conclusions most 
people (and courts) would reasonably draw from 
their names. 
(9) It may seem unfair to criticize manufacturers 
without offering any solutions. One easy thing to do 
would be for all blood glucose tests (in fact, tests 
data from any equipment) to be assigned a serial 
number. Along with the glucometer ID, it would then 
be trivial to detect lost data (additionally, using 
digital signatures to circumvent security problems). 
Lost or corrupt data should then be routinely 
reported to the manufacturer’s post-market 
surveillance team. It would then be easy for a 
hospital to use best efforts to respond and recover it. 
(10) There are published papers on the performance 
of hospital equipment; manufacturers should follow 
this literature and update and respond to research 
insights. 
What researchers should consider  
(1) A serious issue remains for researchers, the 
industry and regulators to address is that clinical 
trials alone are insufficient to justify the quality of 
computer systems or devices in normal use. The 
current peer reviewed literature is inadequate. We 
need both: clinical research (do things measure the 
clinical factors they claim?) and situated IT and HCI 
research of effectiveness in the real complexity of 
healthcare (will they be used correctly and is the data 
reliable?). Such research needs tying up ‘end to end’: 
is the final data, however the clinicians summarize or 
interact with it, effective for clinical use and correctly 
based on true clinical data? 
(2) While security research has a high profile, security 
is only one aspect of the potential problems and 
vulnerabilities of medical devices and systems. More 
research is needed on end-to-end dependability, 
from HCI to networking and multi-vendor databases, 
interoperability, etc. 
(3) Researchers should lead an analogous structure to 
the Information Sharing Analysis Organizations have 
already established for cybersecurity. 
(4) Formal methods are a substantial research area 
that has resulted in many robust approaches to 
software development, widely used in aviation, for 
example. SPARK Ada is a good place for programmers 
to start.52 One of the many research problems is how 
to migrate large, complex, error prone software (as in 
blood glucometers and their networking, for 
example) into high quality software that works ‘well 
enough’ — and increasingly more reliably — until it is 
rigorously correct. 
(5) Modern ideas for dependable distributed systems 
could be applied to the problems of getting data 
around hospitals. Distributed ledgers may not be the 
solution in the present case, but distributed ledger 
thinking could be very productive. 
(6) Throughout this paper I have criticized the culture 
of assuming IT and data is perfect. In the UK, this 
culture is enshrined in law: it is presumed that IT 
works correctly.53 Computers are deemed to be ‘in 
order’ and ‘properly set and calibrated’ – yet the 
position is even more absurd than described above, 
as Mason explains:54 
                                                          
52 John Barnes, High Integrity Software: The SPARK Approach to 
Safety and Security (Addison Wesley, 2003). 
53 Electronic Evidence, chapter 6; Stephen Mason, ‘Electronic 
evidence: A proposal to reform the presumption of reliability and 
hearsay,’ Computer Law & Security Review, 30(1):80–84, 2014. 
DOI: 10.1016/j.clsr.2013.12.005. 
54 Stephen Mason, ‘Artificial intelligence: Oh really? And why judges 
and lawyers are central to the way we live now – but they don’t know 
it,’ Computer and Telecommunications Law Review, 2017, Volume 
23, Issue 8, 213 – 225, 222. 
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‘The presumption also illustrates the 
hypocrisy at the heart of English law. Lawyers 
write clauses for contracts relating to the use 
of software code that require the user to 
accept that the software is not free of errors. 
Such contract terms are considered so normal 
that nobody appears to understand this 
fundamental contradiction between the 
presumption and the acceptance of flawed 
software code as being normal.’ 
We cannot simply blame the police or the hospitals 
when they reflect the absurd and hypocritical legal 
presumptions from the legal culture in which they 
operate. While Mason gives a very professional 
discussion, including the problems of the 
inscrutability of proprietary systems (e.g., those that 
are not open source) and the imbalance between 
prosecution and defence scrutiny, the challenge to 
researchers is to create awareness and 
transformation of this absurd legal position. Until 
that changes, everything else is pushing against the 
tide. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(7) Researchers always need resourcing, and the 
convergence of cybersecurity, healthcare risks and 
costs, big data and blockchain technology closely 
matches many national research funding priorities, to 
say nothing of digitizing healthcare and increasingly 
relying on (unregulated? insecure?) medical apps. 
Blunt end human factors (e.g., design error by 
manufacturers) is often overlooked, for exactly the 
same reasons (‘loss of situational awareness’) that 
cybersecurity is overlooked by healthcare — people 
are too busy doing, urgent, hard complex jobs, and 
this distracts attention from longer-term, broader 
priorities that are not immediately visible. 
(8) Healthcare IT is very complex, beholden to 
confidentiality (patient data, and commercial 
confidentiality), lack of data, poor data, and 
numerous incompatible vendors and independent 
initiatives (such as national funding for AI for cancer 
diagnosis, but not for dementia), and results in 
workarounds and more. Meta-research needs to help 
figure out what an improved healthcare IT 
infrastructure would look like and how to get there 
safely from here. 
 
 
